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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
JANET R. COX,
Plaintiff/Appellant,

REPLY BRIEF

-vs-

Case No.

K. NORMAN COX,

Trial Court No. 904402060

Defendant/Appellee.

92-0818

Priority Classification 15

REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT
PLAINTIFF/APPELLANT

(hereinafter

"plaintiff"

or

"wife")

submits the following as her Reply Brief in the above-entitled
matter:

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
1.

There is no stipulation on file with the trial court,

either as an exhibit, as a part of the record, or as a written
pleading.

Therefore, to the extent that the defendant's argument

in his brief relies upon a stipulation of the parties, no such
stipulation appears of record. Because there is no stipulation of
record, the trial court's findings are inadequate, and the matter
must be remanded for adequate findings.
2.

The

trial

court's

distribution

of

assets

was

so

inequitable as to constitute an abuse of discretion. Specifically,
the

court

should

have

awarded

plaintiff

one-half

the

Orem

residence.
3.
was

an

The failure of the trial court to award plaintiff alimony
abuse

of

discretion.

The

trial

court

relied

upon

defendant's bald assertion that he was unable to work for medical
reasons, without so much as a medical record or medical report to
substantiate his claim, and in the face of a significant employment
history.
4.

The trial court erred in relying upon Rule 68 of the Utah

Rules of Civil Procedure, to award defendant attorney's fees.
5.

Plaintiff

should

be

awarded

her

court

costs

and

attorney's fees in bringing this appeal.

DETERMINATIVE PROVISIONS. CASES, STATUTES AND RULES
There is no case law authority nor statutory

authority

believed by plaintiff to be wholly dispositive of the issues on
appeal. However, Rule 68 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, may
be dispositive of one issue on appeal.

ARGUMENT
POINT I:

THERE IS NO STIPULATION OF RECORD
FOR SETTLEMENT OF THIS CASE.

Plaintiff, in her opening brief, returned to source documents
(such as the premarital contract of the parties) to analyze the
case. The defendant, in his brief, relies upon a stipulation which
2

is putatively of record in this matter.
stipulation

of record

In fact, there is no

in this case, other than non-specific

references in the transcript to the fact that a stipulation exists.
There is no written pleading which is a stipulation on file in this
case. There is no exhibit marked and on file in the record in this
case containing the stipulation.

The stipulation was not made a

part of the oral record at the time of trial, so that it would
appear as part of the transcript. The stipulation simply does not
exist.
To the extent that the stipulation is a basis for the
defendant's
unsupported.

argument

in

his

brief,

his

argument

is wholly

To the extent that the trial court's decision in the

matters which are the subject of this appeal relies in part on the
stipulation forming a foundation for the court's ruling, the
court's ruling is wholly unsupported by evidence or by stipulation
or by adequate findings.
This case must, therefore, be remanded for the taking of
additional evidence, and for specific findings either to support
the trial court's assumptions about the stipulation, or to support
the finding that a stipulation existed.

3

POINT II. THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION
IN FAILING TO AWARD THE PLAINTIFF ONEHALF THE OREM RESIDENCE.
As set forth in plaintiff's opening brief, the circumstances
which occurred immediately before and during the marriage of the
parties are such that the plaintiff acquired a legal interest in
and an equitable interest in the Orem residence.

This property

interest should have been divided equally between the parties, as
of the date of the decree of divorce.
First of all, the trial court erred in dividing the value of
the real property as of the date of the parties' separation in
1990, rather than as of the date of the divorce trial in 1992. The
court specifically made a finding regarding the value of the Orem
property at the time of separation (Finding of Fact No. 13, R.O.
A., 212). The court did not at any point value the home as of the
date of the divorce. Ordinarily, property must be valued as of the
date of divorce. Morgan v. Morgan. 854 P.2d, 559 (Ut. App., 1993).
Defendant alleges that plaintiff stipulated to this valuation date,
but as noted above, there is no stipulation of record.
Defendant in his brief argues that the trial court properly
awarded the Orem residence to the defendant, based upon a number of
factors.

First

of

all, defendant

argues

that

the

parties

"stipulated" that the value of defendant7s home prior to marriage
and prior to remodeling, was $77,000.00.
4

This "stipulation" does

not appear in any portion of the record.
Next, defendant argues that the court properly determined that
the fair market value of the home at the time of separation was
$105,000.00.

As noted above, it was error for the trial court to

value the home at the time of separation (1990) rather than at the
time of the divorce in 1992.
Next,

defendant

asserts

that

plaintiff's

sale

of

her

premarital residence and her investment of the proceeds of that
sale into the remodeling of the defendant's home should somehow
work in favor of the defendant receiving all of the Orem property.
In fact, the wife's sale of her premarital residence, and her
reinvestment of the net proceeds of that sale into the defendant's
home, are factors favoring the validity of the deed which grants
plaintiff a legal interest in the Orem property, and favors
plaintiff receiving one-half interest in the Orem home.
Defendant claims that the premarital contract of the parties,
and the warranty deed from defendant to plaintiff argue against
plaintiff's interest in the Orem real estate.

In fact, as set

forth in plaintiff's brief, defendant executed a warranty deed to
plaintiff before he signed the antenuptial agreement.

One day

later, he then signed the antenuptial agreement which sets forth
his net worth in the sum of approximately $370,000.00, but fails to
itemize what assets comprise that net worth.
5

In other words, the

home is not listed as an item making up his net worth for purposes
of the antenuptial agreement.
parties

to

contradict

the

There is no stipulation of the

plain meaning

of

the

antenuptial

agreement and the warranty deed, read in conjunction with each
other.

The plain meaning, from the four corners of the two

documents, is that plaintiff owned a full undivided one-half
interest in the Orem residence.

The trial court abused its

discretion in failing to uphold the deed, and in failing to award
plaintiff one-half the equity in the home as of the date of
divorce.
Defendant argues in his brief that he intended the warranty
deed to secure only the plaintiff's remodeling expenditures.

Had

this been defendant's intention, the antenuptial agreement and/or
the warranty deed could have addressed this issue specifically.
However, the warranty deed does not make any reference to any
particular percentage interest or dollar interest being granted to
the plaintiff.

It simply gives plaintiff an undivided one-half

interest in the Orem home.

The trial court should not have

considered, and this Court should not consider, the defendant's
parole evidence contradicting a written contract and written deed,
when the plain meaning of the contract and deed are evident from
the documents themselves.
Defendant argues at length in his brief that this Court should
6

analyze the distribution of the Orem residence as though it were
premarital property.

This is simply not an appropriate analysis

under the circumstances of this case. The Orem residence lost its
character as premarital property when the defendant executed a
warranty deed to the plaintiff prior to the parties' marriage
granting to plaintiff
property.

an undivided

one-half

interest

in the

Further, the defendant sealed this bargain when he

signed a premarital contract failing to specify that the residence
be treated

as premarital

property.

Therefore, all of

the

defendant's analysis in his brief regarding the supposed premarital
character of the Orem real estate is simply not applicable in this
case.

The Orem home should have been treated as a marital asset.
Defendant, in his brief, attempts to characterize the warranty

deed as an "after-thought," as something incompatible with the
provisions of the antenuptial agreement.

In fact, as has been

repeatedly noted by the plaintiff, the warranty deed can be read in
a manner totally compatible with the antenuptial agreement.

This

Court can and should interpret these two documents as compatible,
through the following analysis:

the parties intended to provide

security for the plaintiff, in the face of her sale of her
premarital home, and intended to protect plaintiff's substantial
investment in the remodeling of the defendant's home. Therefore,
defendant deeded a full one-half interest in the home to plaintiff,
7

before marriage.

Thereafter, the parties executed an antenuptial

agreement which failed to mention the Orem residence at all,
because the Orem residence was not contemplated to be a part of the
antenuptial agreement.

The antenuptial agreement disposes of all

the rest of the defendant's property, and all the rest of the
plaintiff's property.
In Berman v. Berman, 749 P.2d, 1271 (Ut. App. , 1988), the Utah
Court of Appeals held that antenuptial agreements are to be
construed and treated in the same manner as other contracts.

The

ordinary and usual meaning of the words used are to be given
effect, and effect is to be given to the entire agreement without
ignoring any part of the agreement.

If the court gives the

antenuptial agreement and the warranty deed, read together, the
interpretation proposed above by plaintiff, then the requirements
of the Berman decision will be satisfied.
Defendant devotes a substantial portion of his brief to an
analysis of the question of whether a warranty deed executed
subsequent to an antenuptial agreement abrogates the terms and
provisions of the antenuptial agreement. This analysis is all well
and good, but it has absolutely no application to the instant case.
In the case now at bar, defendant executed the warranty deed before
he executed the antenuptial agreement.
signed

the

antenuptial

agreement, which
8

Thereafter, defendant
also

contains

plain

language, and does not mention the real property which had earlier
been deeded to plaintiff.

Therefore, all of defendant's analysis

about whether the warranty deed voids the antenuptial agreement is
inapplicable to the facts of this case.
Defendant argues in his brief that the antenuptial contract
was executed days before the marriage and was prepared in a hurry.
This does not affect
agreement.

in any way

the enforceability

of the

It must still be interpreted according to the plain

meaning of its language.

Of course, if defendant wishes to claim

the contract is void as an adhesion contract or because defendant
was under duress when it was executed, plaintiff will stipulate
that the contract is void.

Then the warranty deed stands alone,

granting plaintiff one-half the home.
Defendant seems to think that plaintiff argues the antenuptial
agreement

is void, due

to non-disclosure

defendant's brief, page 24.)

of

assets.

This is not the case.

(See

Plaintiff

simply argues that the itemization of defendant's assets does not
specify that the house in issue is included within the calculation
of defendant's net worth at marriage.
contract.

This does not void the

It makes it possible to read the warranty deed and

contract consistently with each other.
In summary, plaintiff should be awarded one-half the Orem
house.
9

POINT III. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO
AWARD THE PLAINTIFF ALIMONY.
As noted in plaintiff's opening brief, under the three-prong
analysis in Jones v. Jones. 700 P.2d,

1072

(Ut. 1985), the

plaintiff should receive alimony from the defendant, at least in
the sum of $250.00 per month for three years, to enable plaintiff
to retrain.
The trial court specifically found that plaintiff was unable
to meet her monthly obligations with her own income, and that she
was employed full-time.
receiving

assistance

In order to make ends meet, she was

from

her

parents

and

from

her church.

Plaintiff satisfies two of the three requirements for receipt of
alimony under Jones.

She is in need and she cannot meet her own

needs.
The only prong of the Jones analysis which is truly in dispute
is the issue of the defendant's ability to contribute to the
plaintiff's support.

Defendant notes in his brief that he became

unemployed in October 1991 (during the pendency of this action)
when he sold his business. Defendant asserts in his brief that his
only income at the time of trial was $554.00 per month from
unemployment compensation.
and

contends

Further, defendant contended at trial

in his brief

that he

suffers

from

a physical

disability which precludes him from seeking full-time employment in
his area of training.
10

Def^nii mi "

ii | i i ni

i

internally contradictory.

ni iii

ni i

mi

ii ni iiuj i , j U I M C o u r t a r e

He states on the one hand that ho is

receiving unemployment compensation, which, as a mattni

nl I.

regu i :i : es that I: n = t > s a ::: t:::i = ] ;;,; seeki rig and at) I e to accept i ull-time
employment. Utah Code Annotated f §35-4-4(c) i 1991 as amendec
the alternative, ^
to

* -• * ^

-

suffer from

: • *

l

i

oi defendant's brief),

:«tw •

efendant .....

t

+-~ produce at trial "
r. opinion that

**. .4. care provider

medi

even cm

: ) support M I claim. it-

o i: i*--na or Mmily member * * testify

He failea iu produc

^

^

was physically disabled from employment.

point.

Defendant cannot

ways•

evidence to support his own self-serving

did ih't

; n/-

«• .iaor accepting t ull-time employment.

(See paragraph «», page
have *

*

-"i-

-.n. -

. i reports to ver I i ;, »M ^ condition.
Plaintiff acknowledges that considerable latitude is given

trial

courts

iiiiii makincf

iitnl property

f act.n.i II dpf p m n n ii imp
interests, and

actions are entitled t a presumption M
a

^

,s

'H- *^'

"

that

the

validity,

ill
trial

nJ IIJSI.IIHJ
court's

Hogue v. Hogue.

—* - Jiorpe v. Qsguthorpe,
... M i ! uiro acknowledges that this

Court will not modify the trial court's determinations unless there
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has been a misunderstanding or misapplication of the law, resulting
in substantial and prejudicial error, or that the ruling is against
the clear weight of the evidence, or that such a serious inequity
would result as to manifest the clear abuse of discretion. Naranjo
v. Naranjof 751 P.2d, 1144 (Ut. App., 1988).
determination

to

believe

the

The

defendant's

trial

court's

self-serving

and

unsubstantiated claims of disability, and its determination to
believe defendant had to quit his job and sell his business in the
face of a pending divorce trial, manifests a clear abuse of
discretion on the part of the trial court within the meaning of the
Hogue decision, as to the plaintiff's alimony claim.
The

Jones

decision

does

not

preclude

the

court

from

considering other factors as well as the three factors set forth in
Jones.

Rappleye v. Rappleye, 855 P.2d, 260 (Ut. App., 1993); and

Boyle v. Boyle, 735 P.2d, 669 (Ut. App., 1987).

In the instant

case, the trial court abused its discretion in failing to consider
other relevant factors such as the circumstances in which defendant
was left at the time of divorce compared to the circumstances of
the plaintiff. Defendant was left with an unencumbered home having
a value in excess of $100,000.00, to satisfy his housing needs. He
was left with other assets having a value of more than $150,000.00.
In comparison, the plaintiff was left to obtain housing through the
assistance of her parents and her church.
12

She was left with no

i 11, -1

assets

>• »*• i »'"* •

i

juuta 111

circumstances, her request for alimony

herself.
<?

Under

these

>\) on per mont n rev

r three years in whic^ +-> retrain was

perioc
<

^
f

. iscretion ,; failinc

grant this

request.
Defendant asks this court *
plainM ff-' •- reques

innnv

business in Octobei ot ;4f

*
.•

-* defendant had sold his

defendant asks this Court to consider

that he was "forced" L O sejn

--

• .J isui sttmiidi JII>MM '

'.» year after the parties 7 separation.

apprny 1 nwi M| ,

in effect,

defendant asks this Court to consider the sale of hi s business and
his

resulting

financial

sep<

"

z^e

^eqUent

tit 110 argues, where it is lo his advantage, that the

home should be valued at the time of separation, about -nr- ----r^
prior to the sale of the hiisinpss

"i,ii»i ' • • <

•ii|l|i 1 i n 1 i c ;

adopted

ttii s approach, valuing the home at tine time or the separation, but
considering the sale of defendant's business, and his supposed loss
incurred

a

1; :•.* ; . ..'

and /or a i . i;, ay award.

the

defendant

r esui

simply

nroperty

Highlights

discretion, ii1 picking and

This ctrgument
the
••

trial

cour

-N v.he 1 <xrz *i
abuse
Mi^ assets

• :: 11 : :i nak s • assessments, unreasonably favoring the defendant.
Defendant argues i 11 his brief, at page o.^, chat his income W H S
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$554.00 per month. In fact, in addition to his unemployment income
of $554.00 per month, defendant was receiving $500.00 per month in
contract proceeds from the sale of his business, and he had
significant other assets.

(Finding of Pact No. 19). After taxes,

defendant and plaintiff had substantially similar net monthly
incomes.

But defendant had his housing free of costs, and had

reserves, while plaintiff did not.
Defendant argues in his brief that he experienced a greater

decrease in his

net

worth,

in

terms

of

dollars,

than did

the

plaintiff. Defendant may have suffered the loss of more money than
the plaintiff during the course of the parties' marriage, but this
is because he had so much more to begin with.

In terms of a

percentage of defendant's assets, defendant suffered only a thirtyfive percent loss in his net worth, as opposed to an eighty-five
percent loss in plaintiff's net worth during the parties' marriage.
Specifically, prior to the marriage, plaintiff had a net worth of
$74,000.00.

(Finding of Fact No. 7). At the time of the divorce,

plaintiff's net worth was $10,539.00.
On the

(Finding of Fact No. 15).

other hand, defendant's net worth at the time of marriage

was $368,000.00.

(Finding of Fact No. 7).

At the time of the

divorce, the defendant's net worth was $232,249.00.
Plaintiff has met her burden of proof to establish that the
trial court committed error in failing to award plaintiff alimony.
14

TN>

-wittf"

r1'1

uiii.iii ivi1

1

I .,

"In.

'.ial

court

^r

take

appropriate findings, and to award plaintiff alimony i n the sum of
$250.00 per month for a period of three years.

POINT IV.

M l i f i i I. in
fees.

in i

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ORDERING
THAT THE PLAINTIFF PAY ATTORNEY'S
FEES TO THE DEFENDANT.
i aereu plaintiff to pay defendant attorney's

As noted In plaintiff /p " opening brief, the trial

co^rt

improperly applied Rule 68 ot uie Utah Rules of Civil Procedure e
pet'iM i ni ii„> | I \

I lets « I judgment, The lower court assumed that the

plaintiff would be responsible to pay attorney's fees pursuant to
Rule 68.

In fact, Rule 68 wou

del endii'inl i, costs, not .Attorney .» : ^^.- .

*. trial court made n,
4

ncurred after

Further, the trial court abused its discretior

requiring

finding about the defendant's costs

his case,

the date of the offer oi judgmer
t ees

plaintiff

-^

*
about

fees, when defendant haa

t,ay

-•.!••»

monthly income of $l,054.uu j.

^

defendant s attorney's
/4-

-^ » ex.
m

expenses.
In his brief, defendant argues that, pursuant to Utah Code
15

Annotatedr

§30-3-3 (1989 as amended), a trial court may award

attorney's fees in a divorce proceeding, so long as the award is
based on evidence as to the receiving spouse's financial needs, the
ability of the paying spouse to pay and the reasonableness of the
award. Defendant is correct in this statement about Utah statutory
law.

However, the trial court made absolutely no findings about

any of the factors set forth in Utah Code Annotatedr §30-3-3, and
specifically stated that the sole basis for its award of attorney's
fees was Rule 68.

At the very least, this action should be

remanded to the trial court for the making of adequate finding as
to the issue of attorney's fees.

Further, based upon the facts of

this case, it was an abuse of discretion to order plaintiff to pay
defendant's attorney's fees, even under the requirements of §30-33.

POINT V.

DEFENDANT SHOULD BE ORDERED TO PAY
PLAINTIFF'S ATTORNEY'S FEES IN
THIS APPEAL.

Plaintiff seeks an award of her attorney's fees in this
appeal.

The trial court has abused its discretion, and committed

plain error in the interpretation of Utah law. Plaintiff should be
awarded the attorney's fees she has incurred on appeal.

Bell v.

Bell, 810 P.2d, 489 (Ut. App. , 1991), and Crouse v. Crouse, 817
P.2d, 836 (Ut. App., 1991).
16

CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the trial court in
This Court should reman r1 *h i i*

this matter should be reversed,
matter
1.

For the triai

about the stipulatior

2.

1-)T

alimony

^

!

; make a specific

rinding
+

* -^ - -arties, including spec

entry

judgment awarding

w? ^

ihr^e yea" , H ' I P M
3.

mrt

Li

plaintiff

$250.00 * er month

I «"<«

I

nctober 1992; and

For entry of a judgment awarding the plaintiff rv>t>~

half of the parties 7 right, title and
i er; i ill Hi:* •

i I I h*.j *1<I1.I.J ul ^nt ry ol

i
•«*- d e c r e e •.. v d i v o r c e ;

and
4.

For entrv oi an ordei

<-

pieviuii.s .IWI-IMI r»l attorney's fee--.- :o defendant; and
5.

For an order awarding - f r plaintiff her court costs

and attorney's fees incurred in tins appeal
t e cie t e i iii r H M Ill Ill t I t h e

court.
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RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED THIS / s

day of September, 1993.

CORPORON & WILLIAMS

MARY C. CORPORON
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant
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